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Empirical studies analysing productivity effects of inward FDI in Latin America (LA) are 
inconclusive. We argue that investigating aggregate FDI masks interesting effects of FDI that 
take place within and across sectors. Moreover, the potential of FDI to generate productivity 
effects  differs  across sectors. For these reasons  and because sectoral  FDI intensities vary 
significantly  among  LA  countries  and  change  over  time,  we  investigate  the  productivity 
effects  of  FDI  in  eight  different  sectors  including  the  primary  sector,  manufacturing  and 
services. Besides FDI, sector-specific institutional factors, education and a sector‘s export 
share are considered as control variables. Given the likely endogeneity of variables, a GMM 
system estimation approach is used. The results indicate that positive productivity effects can 
be found in all sectors, although they may depend on specific conditions or are limited to a 
certain time period. Direct productivity effects are highest in the primary sector (agriculture, 
mining and petroleum production) and in financial services. In contrast, FDI in manufacturing 
and in transport and telecommunications generates productivity spillovers to nearly all other 
sectors.  
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I. Introduction  
 
In the early 1990s,  Latin American (LA) countries  started to  liberalize foreign trade and 
investment  expecting  to  promote  growth  and  development.  Consequently,  since  the  mid 
1990s the stock of inward FDI rose impressively with an average annual growth rate of 30 per 
cent (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2007). However, macroeconomic empirical studies investigating the 
growth effects of inward FDI in LA (e.g., De Gregorio 1992, De Mello 2000, Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles 2003, Cuadros et al. 2004, Prüfer and Tondl 2010) remain inconclusive. In 
some cases no effects are found or only under certain conditions.  
We argue that a major reason of these unclear results is that all these studies explain growth 
by aggregate FDI and do not distinguish between different sectors where FDI is operating. In 
our view this is problematic since interesting FDI-growth relationships which appear within 
and across sectors are hidden.  
Indeed, the sectoral FDI structure in LA displays important differences and the intensity of 
FDI (stock of FDI per employed) varies widely across sectors and over time. In many LA 
countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru, a huge share of 40-70 per cent of FDI is 
allocated in mining and petroleum production, a sector which also shows one of the highest 
FDI intensity. However, in most of the more developed LA countries, i.e., Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Costa Rica, the main share of FDI has flown into the manufacturing sector. In the 
1990s, FDI has also increasingly targeted two important service sectors formerly operated by 
state monopolies: (i) electricity and water supplies which gained an important share of FDI in 
Argentina  and  Chile,  and  (ii)  transport  and  telecommunications  which  currently  holds  an 
important FDI share in Brazil and in some Central American countries. In both sectors, the 
FDI intensity increased in all LA countries. Finally, financial services reached an important 
share in aggregate FDI stocks in the most developed LA countries, i.e., in Brazil, Mexico and 
Chile.  
There are manifold reasons to conjecture that the productivity effects of FDI vary across 
sectors. As argued in Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and Kugler (2006), productivity effects of FDI 
operate  in  three  different  ways:  (i)  a  direct  productivity  effect  in  the  host  company,  (ii) 
horizontal productivity effects within the same sector through pro-competitive effects and 
technology spillovers to competitors, often associated with the mobility of trained workers, 
and (iii) technology spillovers through backward and forward linkages to other sectors. FDI 
does not only introduce new technologies into the host economy, but also raises the skill level 
and changes the competition structure. In primary production (agriculture, mining, petroleum 
production),  FDI  is  an  important  investment  source  in  LA.  Its  main  contribution  is  to 
introduce  new  technologies  in  agriculture  and  to  bring  new  vintage  capital  in  extractive 
industries (Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare 2004). In manufacturing, FDI creates new productions 
employing the latest technologies, often in the form of greenfield investments. It also entails 
an upgrading of skills since advanced foreign manufacturing plants require specific skills. 
Manufacturing  FDI  has  also  an  important  pro-competitive  effect  on  local  producers. 
Furthermore, since manufacturing requires many different intermediate goods and business 
services (transport, telecommunications, etc.), new technological standards in the investor‘s 
plant will lead to a demand for higher standards of intermediate goods and services (backward 
and  forward  technology  spillovers).  In  the  service  sector,  where  monopolistic  market 
structures prevailed in the early 1990s (e.g., in telecommunications and in public services), 
FDI is supposed to increase competition that should enhance productivity within the sector. 
Moreover, since services are generally used in many branches —often a branch uses a fairly 
specific set of services— FDI in services is supposed to display substantial spillover effects to 
other sectors (Arnold et al. 2006).    3 
Studies  which address  sectoral  growth effects  of FDI  are still rare and do not  cover  LA 
countries. Moreover, the few existing sectoral studies take only a part of the issues raised 
above into account.  
For example, Aykut and Sayek (2007) estimate for developing countries (DC) whether the 
sectoral composition of FDI matters for aggregate productivity growth and conclude that a 
high share of agriculture in total FDI is negative for an economy‘s growth, whereas a high 
share of manufacturing FDI is significantly positive. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) also look 
at DC and explore whether the industry composition of aggregate FDI is associated with 
differences in countries‘ growth rates. They propose that aggregate growth in DC is higher if 
a country has a high FDI share in the machinery and electrical equipment industry rather than 
in  the  food,  chemical  or  metal  industries.  Whereas  those  studies  look  at  the  relationship 
between the sectoral composition of aggregate FDI and aggregate growth, Crespo Cuaresma 
et  al.  (2007) and  Castejón and Wörz (2010) estimate the effect  of FDI in  manufacturing 
industries on the industry‘s output growth, the former for Central and Eastern European and 
Asian countries,  the latter  for OECD countries. Although not  explicitly addressing sector 
effects, Kugler (2006) addresses issues related to this paper when investigating intra- and 
inter-industry productivity effects of FDI with pooled micro-level data for Colombia. He finds 
productivity spillovers to upstream industries. 
This paper aims to address the following questions:  
(i) to estimate the productivity effects of FDI in different economic sectors in LA and to 
examine whether they differ across sectors; 
(ii) to analyse the productivity spillover effects of FDI to other sectors (technology spillovers 
to upstream and downstream sectors);  
(iii) to compare the importance of FDI for a sector‘s productivity with the impact of other 
general or sector-specific policy variables.  
We  consider  inward  FDI  in  eight  different  economic  sectors  (two  primary  sectors, 
manufacturing, and five service sectors) for a panel of 14 LA countries in the period 1990-
2006. The effect of FDI on sector productivity is estimated together with a set of conditional 
variables  including  education  and  sector-specific  institutional  characteristics  as  well  as 
productivity spillover effects from FDI in other sectors.  
If necessary, we also test whether the effect of FDI depends on a threshold level of another 
factor, e.g., the income level of the recipient economy, as explored in a number of previous 
FDI studies, particularly in Prüfer and Tondl (2008) for LA countries.  
Since practically all our variables can be considered to be endogenous, we selected the GMM 
system  estimator  procedure  as  proposed  by  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998).  This  estimator 
accounts for endogeneity and is particularly suited for our purpose since it can be used with 
variables  that  contain  roots  close  to  one  —typically  the  case  with  FDI  and  many  other 
variables in DC- and because it is more accurate with persistent series.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first which addresses the issue of productivity 
effects and spillovers of FDI on the sectoral level for LA. Learning about that should help 
governments  to  evaluate  their  FDI  strategies  which  often  try  to  channel  FDI  to  specific 
sectors. Moreover, the study shows under which conditions FDI will yield productivity gains 
in specific sectors. Finally, this study takes the important issue of endogeneity in FDI growth 
models seriously and addresses it in a suitable econometric framework.        
Our main finding is that FDI has a positive productivity effect on all sectors. However, in 
certain sectors this effect arises only under certain conditions, in a specific time period or only 
with a few LA countries.    4 
Our results indicate that FDI in LA has the highest direct effect on productivity in the primary 
sector, being more than three times higher than in manufacturing. However, manufacturing 
FDI  has  positive  productivity  effects  on  almost  all  other  sectors,  often  higher  than  in 
manufacturing itself. In the service sector, a very high productivity effect of FDI within the 
sector is found in financial services and electricity, but subject to specific conditions. FDI  in 
the transport and telecommunication sector as well as in financial services is a source of 
productivity spillovers to several other sectors. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II, we discuss the development of FDI in 
different economic sectors in LA since the 1990s and raise some hypotheses on its likely 
effect  on  productivity.  In  section  III,  we  specify  our  model  for  estimation.  Section  IV, 
describes  the  data  set,  while  Section  V  discusses  the  econometric  issues  involved  in  our 
model and the estimation method. Section VI presents the results and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Sectoral FDI in Latin America and likely productivity effects 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s the stock of inward FDI propelled to unprecedented levels 
in LA. FDI entered into all sectors of the economy. However, FDI has not reached all sectors 
to the same extent. This development will be discussed in the following.  
We  consider  FDI  in  eight  economic  sectors:  (i)  agriculture  and  fishing,  (ii)  mining  and 
quarrying, (iii) manufacturing, (iv) electricity, gas and water supply, (v) construction, (vi) 
trade,  repair,  hotels  and  restaurants,  (vii)  transport  and  communications,  (viii)  financial 
intermediation and business services.
1  
Looking at the composition of FDI stocks, i.e., the share of a sector in total FDI, (see Table 1) 
one notes that manufacturing FDI accounted on average for 26 per cent of total FDI in 2006. 
In the most developed LA countries it clearly has attracted the major share of FDI: Argentina 
30 per cent of total FDI, Brazil 35 per cent, Mexico 45 per cent and Costa Rica 55 per cent. In 
another  LA leading economy, Chile, however, other sectors were more prominent FDI 
recipients.  In many LA countries, mining and oil production holds a major  share in FDI 
stocks: Ecuador 76 per cent, Bolivia 49 per cent, Venezuela 34 per cent, Chile and Colombia 
33 per cent, and Argentina 27 per cent of total FDI stocks in 200 6. Agricultural FDI is 
negligible in most countries and has declined. In Costa Rica a nd Honduras, it still accounts 
for 15 and 13 per cent of FDI stocks in 200 6, respectively. In the service sector, financial 
services, transport and telecommunications as well as in many countries also  electricity, gas 
and water held a not minor share of FDI stocks, which on average reached 11 per cent, 13 per 
cent and 7 per cent in 2006, respectively. 
Since our aim is to investigate the productivity effect of FDI within sectors, we need to look 
at the intensity of FDI in the sectors. As an indicator, we will consider FDI stocks in a sector 
in relation to the employed persons in the sector.
2 Table 1 indicates that mining and quarrying 
as well as electricity, gas and water supply have by far the highest FDI intensity in LA. 
Financial services, manufacturing and transport and communications follow with much lower 
FDI intensities. In general, we observe that the intensity of FDI has grown in almost all 
sectors between 1998 and 2006, most impressively in electricity, gas and water supply and 
transport and communications.  
                                                 
1 This sectoral classification corresponds to the Unctad sectoral FDI statistics, following the ISIC Rev. 3.1 1 digit 
classification. 
2 An alternative measure would be the share of sectoral FDI in the sector‘s GDP. However, since sectoral GDP is 
subject to frequent demand induced variations the GDP share of FDI may artificially fluctuate. As employment 
is more stable, the indicator "FDI per employed" is a better measure of the FDI intensity in a sector.   5 
We will briefly describe the characteristics of the sectors with the highest presence of foreign 
capital and propose some hypotheses about the role of FDI in these sectors.  
 
 
Table 1: FDI and economic sectors in LA 
 
  Share of sector in total FDI stock 
(in per cent)   Change 
Sector  1998  2006   (% points) 
AGRI      Agriculture and fishing   6.0  3.5  -2.5 
MINING    Mining and quarrying   21.9  22.7  0.8 
MANUF    Manufacturing   25.7  26.2  0.5 
ELEC&G&W  Electricity, gas, water supply  9.6  7.7  -1.9 
CONSTR    Construction   2.6  2.3  -0.3 
TRADE     Trade, repair, hotels, restaurants  9.1  8.8  -0.3 
TRANS&COMM  Transport and communications  8.8  13.6  4.8 
FINANCE  Financial intermediation and  
    business services  
 
12.6 
   
11.7  -0.9 
    Others  2.6  2.1  -0.5 
    Total  100.0  100.0   
 
 
FDI stock per employed person 
 (in US-$) 
Growth 
Sector  1998  2006  (in per cent) 
AGRI     Agriculture and fishing  3143.2  2658.6  -15.4 
MINING    Mining and quarrying  78058.1  145205.6  86.0 
MANUF    Manufacturing  3094.7  5444.4  75.9 
ELEC&G&W  Electricity, gas, water supply  23469.9  60405.5  157.4 
CONSTR    Construction  415.7  706.9  70.1 
TRADE     Trade, repair, hotels, restaurants  447.7  809.4  80.8 
TRANS&COMM   Transport and communications  1899.3  4937.2  160.0 
FINANCE   Financial intermediation and  
    business   services  4398.2  8423.7  91.5 
Notes: period average of countries, Data sources see Section IV below, sector classification ISIC Rev. 3.1.     
 
LA countries are  rich in minerals  and hydrocarbons. Many of them, particularly Mexico, 
Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia are important producers of oil and natural gas. The region is 
also a major world producer in copper, gold, iron ore, zinc, nickel and bauxite. In view of the 
growing demand for these resources and high world market prices the sector is not only an 
important revenue source for LA countries but has become also unbrokenly interesting for 
foreign investors. Particularly in Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela FDI is 
highly important for the sector (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The role of FDI has even further 
increased in recent years. All major multinational oil companies hold investments in LA and 
Brazil‘s state oil company Petrobras has become a major investor in other Latin American 
countries. Despite Venezuela‘s and Bolivia‘s aim to restrict foreign ownership in the sector, 
FDI has in fact hardly dropped but changed ownership in favour of intra-LA participation.  
Extraction of minerals and oil and gas deposits is very capital intensive and, therefore, relies 
either on state-owned companies or foreign capital. Since the exploitation of natural resources 
demands more and more special technologies, international firms are an important source of 
expertise for these productions (Unctad 2007).   6 
During  the  1990s,  two  LA  sectors,  (i)  electricity,  gas  and  water  and  (ii)  transport  and 
telecommunications,  watched  important  regulatory  reforms  and  privatizations  (ECLAC 
2005). These sectors were traditionally state-owned monopolies in LA, financed by public 
budget.  In  view  of  the  economic  development  and  consequently  rising  demand  for  these 
services, the opening to private investment, be it domestic or from abroad, was considered as 
a good way to assure the capital required to increase the supply of these services and to 
increase competition that should lead to increased efficiency and lower prices. The time path 
of  privatizations  varied  among  countries.  Chile  and  Argentina  were  the  earliest  in  the 
privatization  of  electricity,  gas  and  water.  In  the  telecommunications,  Chile,  Argentina, 
Mexico and Venezuela privatized in the early 1990s, whereas Brazil and Central American 
countries followed only in 1998. The opening to private capital attracted important inflows of 
FDI, particularly from European companies which searched to diversify markets, but also 
from other LA countries.
3 The LA telecommunications sector became the largest recipient of 
FDI among DC. (Unctad 2004) The FDI intensity in electricity,  gas and water supply has 
become  the  second  highest  in  LA  after  mining  and  quarrying,  while  in  transport  and 
telecommunications the FDI intensity is lower  but has also steeply grown  (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1).  The  effects  of privatization in these sectors  were  investigated in a number of 
studies  in  general.  Bortolotti  et  al.  (2002),  for  example,  looked  at  30  privatized 
telecommunication companies in developing and developed countries and found that sales per 
employed  and  the  number  of  access  lines  per  employed  increased  after  privatization. 
Specifically for LA countries, telephone mainlines per capita doubled from 1990 to 1997 after 
privatization (Wallsten 2001, 7). In contrast, electricity privatization experience seems to be 
mixed in LA countries. Price regulations often were poor and prevented new companies from 
investing in new capacity (Unctad 2004). FDI is estimated to account for 28-40 per cent of 
private investment in these sectors. The potential benefits of privatization should be higher in 
the  presence  of  FDI  since  foreign  companies  commonly  operate  with  more  advanced 
technologies.  
Turning to financial and business services, we observe that Mexico, Chile and Brazil show the 
highest presence of FDI (see Fig. 1). Mexico has a penetration rate of foreign capital of 80 per 
cent in banking (assets of foreign owned affiliates to total banking assets), Venezuela, Peru 
and Chile above 40 per cent, and Argentina and Brazil around 30 per cent (Unctad 2004). The 
entry of foreign companies in LA banking followed the financial crises in many LA countries, 
above  all  in  Mexico,  caused  by  over-lending  of  national  banks,  consequent  mistrust  of 
international markets and writing-off of assets so that governments had to open the banking 
business to foreign investors in order to recapitalize the banking system (Bose 2005). Foreign 
companies are considered to strengthen the capital basis of banks in DC, to introduce more 
stability in the banking system of a DC due to their international diversification in operations, 
to restructure domestic banks, to improve products and services and to increase competition in 
the sector. However, foreign banking companies may also drive local competitors out of the 
market and monopolize market power —as has happened in LA where the number of banks 
declined  by  about  30  per  cent  in  many  countries.  They  may  also  make  management  of 
monetary policy more difficult and increase exposure to contagion from international crises 
(Unctad 2004, Moshirian 2006, Bose 2005). Some authors have questioned whether foreign 
investment in LA banks has improved their efficiency, for example, Wong (2004) analyses 
the intermediation efficiency of foreign banks in six LA countries and concludes that only 
Chile became more efficient. 
As concerns the manufacturing sector, Figure 1 shows that FDI is particularly present in the 
richer LA countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica. The steep increase of 
                                                 
3 Endesa de España, EDF from France, the US AES Corporation and Energias de Portugal became the main 
foreign players in the LA electricity sector (ECLAC, 2005).   7 
FDI intensity in Mexico‘s and Costa Rica‘s manufacturing sector is well known. Mexico has 
become a host for US FDI in automotive and electronic components productions, Costa Rica 
for  electronic  circuits.  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  host  an  array  of  diverse  foreign 
productions that aim at serving their local markets.  
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The general productivity effects of FDI have been well described in the literature. FDI is not 
simply investment; it is a specific channel for technology transfer. First, FDI introduces new 
production  technologies  and  managerial  practices  in  the  firm  which  leads  to  a  direct 
productivity  effect.  Second,  FDI  affects  other  producers  in  the  same  sector,  increasing 
competition among incumbent firms. This may either result in pro-competitive effects where 
local producers improve in productivity to hold fiercer competition, or an elimination of non-
competitive local producers and increase of monopoly in the sector. In addition, there may be 
horizontal productivity spillovers to local firms through imitation and labour markets. Foreign 
companies generally provide special skill training to their employees, which will benefit other 
companies if employees change the work place (Markusen and Venables 1999, Görg and 
Greenaway  2004).  Third,  FDI  affects  the  productivity  level  in  upstream  and  downstream 
sectors.  Foreign  companies  will  request  an  increase  of  technological  standards  and 
productivity  from  their  suppliers  of  intermediate  goods  and  input  services  (upstream 
spillovers) and their increased productivity  will benefit  firms  using its products  as  inputs 
(downstream spillovers) (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996).  
Commonly,  micro-level  studies  using  firm  data  have  been  employed  to  investigate  these 
different types of effects from FDI, among them Barrios et al. (2005) and Javorcik (2004) 
and, specifically for LA countries, Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Kugler (2006). These 
studies focus on the effects of FDI in one country and do not distinguish between the effects 
in different sectors.  
In contrast to these studies, we estimate the productivity effects of FDI comparing different 
sectors. Which sector in LA is most likely to draw productivity gains from FDI is not clear a 
priori. One may conjecture that productivity gains will particularly arise in sectors where 
public ownership and monopolies were formerly strong, such as in electricity, gas and water 
supply, transport and communication and financial services. As the studies cited above, we 
examine  productivity  spillovers  to  upstream  and  downstream  sectors  testing  all  possible 
linkages. For example, one might conjecture that the production of goods benefits from FDI 
in  input  services  such  as  communication,  financial  services  etc.  (upstream  linkage). 
Agricultural production may benefit from FDI in food industries and transport (downstream 
linkages). Unlike the above studies, we use sectoral data instead of firm level data which 
permits us to analyze a group of countries together.
4  
 
III. Model specification  
 
In order to estimate the sectoral productivity effects of FDI and spillover effects from other 
sectors we shall test the following specification for each sector. 
 
jt mit jit it jit
it it jit jit jit i jit
u TRADE
FDI FDI Y Y
FDI EDU INST
INST Condition
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 1
      (1) 
 
where i and t are the country and time indices, respectively, j = 1,…,8, m = 1,…,8 and m ≠ j 
are sector indices for the eight sectors.  jt u is an iid process with zero mean and variance 
2
j u , 
while  i is an individual  (time invariant) country-specific effect and  l (l=1,…,8) are the 
parameters to be estimated. 
In this equation, the productivity of sector j,  jit Y , is explained by its one period time lag  1 jit Y , 
                                                 
4 Firm level data sets are poorly comparable between countries.   9 
the intensity of FDI in sector j  ji FDI measured by the stock of FDI per employed, a matrix of 
country level institutional variables  it INST , a matrix of sector-specific institutional variables 
jit INST , a matrix of education variables  it EDU , a set of different export variables of the 
sector  jit TRADE  and spillover effects from FDI in other sectors  mit FDI .  
This specification comes close to a production function where the stock of FDI is considered 
as a knowledge base for technology transfer rather than being simply another type of capital 
(Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz 1990, De Mello 1997, Borensztein et al. 1998). Since there is 
no data available on sectoral investment or capital, and aggregate capital stocks turned out to 
be an inadequate proxy, we cannot estimate a full structural model.  
As in Hall and Jones (1999) we consider productivity to be related to institutional factors. We 
test a number of country level institutional features in  it INST , which are likely to influence 
sector  productivity  such  as  the  general  political  risk,  the  quality  of  the  legal  system,  the 
degree of corruption, the extent of price controls or the quality of bureaucracy. In addition, we 
attempted to account for sector-specific institutional factors in  jit INST , such as the level of 
trade protection in the manufacturing sector, the degree of accomplished privatization in the 
formerly  protected  sectors  electricity,  gas,  water  supply  as  well  as  transport  and 
communication, or the debt ratio as a measure for tightening financial markets in the finance 
sector.  
In  matrix  it EDU   we  consider  several  measures  of  educational  attainment:  the  shares  of 
working  age  population  with  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  educational  attainment. 
Alternatively, we employ an indicator which weights the average years of schooling in the 
population by different, decreasing returns (Hall and Jones 1999).  
A high export share is considered to be associated with higher productivity because exporters 
need to become more productive to compete on world markets, obtain higher profits from 
product innovations and enjoy economies of scale when producing for international markets 
(Helpman and Krugman 1985, Grossman and Helpman 1991). We test the impact of exports 
on  productivity  in  agriculture,  mining  and  quarrying  and  manufacturing  including  in 
jit TRADE either the export intensity of the sector (exports related to sector output) or the share 
of the sector‘s exports to total commodity exports.  
The FDI literature has stressed that the effect of FDI is often subject to certain conditions such 
as  a  certain  level  of  development  of  the  economy  (Blomström  et  al.  1994)  or  some 
institutional characteristics (Prüfer and Tondl 2008). Such conditions are subsumed in the 




Our sample covers 14 LA countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Columbia, 
Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Peru  and  Venezuela. 
Guatemala and Uruguay had to be excluded due to insufficient sectoral FDI data. As FDI 
attains very high levels in Panama but is placed largely in non-productive holding companies 
attracted by favourable tax regulations, we excluded it. The time period considered in our 
analysis is 1990 - 2006. Although, for some countries FDI data is available before 1990, we 
decided to limit our estimations to the period after 1990. The economic framework changed 
considerably  in  LA  between  the  1980s  and  1990s.  In  the  late  1980s,  LA  countries 
implemented  a  number  of  reforms  aiming  at  economic  liberalization,  deregulation  and   10 
macroeconomic stability. Thus, given the economic regime change, it can be expected that the 
relationship between FDI and productivity shows a structural break in 1990. Therefore we 
refrained from pooling pre- and post-1990 data.  
To compute the sectoral FDI intensity we used sectoral inward FDI stocks from Unctad as the 
main data source. That data is reported at historical costs, i.e. any annual increase of the FDI 
stock is registered at the price and exchange rate of that particular year.
5 To complete missing 
values, we used FDI flows data from LA central banks and investment promotion agencies. 
For the rest of the variables, definitions and data sources are reported in the Appendix.  
 
V. Econometric issues and estimation  
 
Our model specified in Equation (1) involves several likely endogenous variables. This needs 
to be considered correctly to get consistent estimates.  
First, considering the relationship between the FDI intensity and productivity, it is likely that 
the relationship runs in both directions. FDI does not only affect productivity growth but FDI 
itself  is  attracted  by  sectors  which  are  more  productive.
6  Second,  our  model  contains 
institutional variables which are generally considered in the literature  (for example Hall and 
Jones 1999) to be endogenous. Countries with higher incomes, or in our case higher sectoral 
productivity,  are  likely  to  have  better  institutions,  i.e. ,  better  law  and  order,  better 
bureaucracy, less corruption and have generally more liberal economic systems, i.e., less price 
controls and less tariffs in our case, and more macroeconomic stability, i.e., less external debt 
as  in  our  model.  Third,  our  model  includes  educational  attainment  rates  and  effective 
schooling rates which are also considered to be endogenous (Cook 2002, Krueger and Lindahl 
2001, Sachs and Warner 1995, Caselli et al. 1996). In more developed economies with higher 
productivity the population is more able to spend time in education. Fourth, a higher export 
share is supposed to induce higher productivity, but countries which are more productive will 
also have better conditions to export intensively. 
There is some empirical literature that addresses the issue of endogeneity between FDI and 
productivity/per capita income in a panel data framework. Several studies investigating the 
determinants  of  FDI  consider  the  endogeneity  between  per  capita  income  and  FDI,  for 
example Busse and Hefeker (2007), Campos and Kinoshita (2008), Demekas et al. (2007) and 
Carstensen  and  Toubal  (2004).  In  contrast,  fewer  panel  data  studies  that  investigate  the 
productivity or growth effects of FDI consider endogeneity. Carkovic and Levine (2005) use 
the GMM system estimator to explain the sensitivity of results in the FDI-growth literature to 
endogeneity. Li and Liu (2005) addressed the same endogeneity issue with a simultaneous 
equations model.  
To account for the problem of endogeneity, we will therefore apply instrumental variables 
estimation. The choice of suitable instruments is crucial for consistency and efficiency of 
estimation. A number of suitable instruments have been proposed in the literature for our 
variables  when  working  with  cross  sections.  However,  there  are  generally  less  suitable 
instruments available for panel data estimations since instruments need to vary with time. The 
solution proposed in the panel data literature is to use lagged observations as instruments. 
                                                 
5 ‗Since such data on FDI stocks is not extremely accurate, sophisticated methods to calculate FDI stocks were 
proposed: Bitzer and Görg (2009) apply the perpetual inventory method. Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007) adjust 
the FDI flows in US-$ by real exchange rate fluctuations. In our case, such methods would introduce additional 
problems related to the heterogeneity of sectors and countries.  
6 See the vast empirical literature on FDI determinants (e.g., Lim (2001) for a review), where productivity is an 
important explanatory variable. Furthermore, several studies investigating Granger causality of the relationship 
found a two-way causality (e.g., De Mello 2000, Hansen and Rand 2006, Chowdhury and Mavrotas 2006).    11 
Several instrumental variables procedures were proposed for panels with fixed effects starting 
with Anderson and Hsiao (1981) who proposed to estimate in differences and use the one 
period  level  lag  as  instrument.  Later,  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  popularized  the  GMM 
difference  estimator  which  became  widely  applied.  They  also  estimate  the  model  in 
differences  to  eliminate  the  fixed  effects  but  then  use  all  available  lags  in  levels  as 
instruments, claiming to increase efficiency of the estimation dramatically.  
For our purpose, a suitable instrumental variables estimator needs to be able to address two 
problems.  First,  the  lagged  dependent  variable  on  the  right-hand  side  in  Equation  (1), 
productivity  1 jit Y , will be a highly persistent variable with a high autoregressive coefficient. 
Other series in our specification may be equally persistent. This leads to the problem of weak 
instruments if lagged levels are used as instruments for equations in differences as with the 
GMM difference estimator. Second, as often in the case of variables from DC, we have to 
assume that practically all our variables contain unit roots: FDI, the education indicators and 
many institutional indicators.
7 The GMM system estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) can deal with both  these problems.
8 Therefore, we will employ the GMM system 
estimator for our estimation.  
The GMM system estimator was also used in Carkovic and Levine (2002). The estimator uses 
a system of (i) equations in differences instrumented by lagged variables in levels and (ii) 
equations in levels instrumented by lagged variables in differences.  
More specifically, for any sector j our model in Equation (1) contains two blocks: the first is a 
system of T – 2 differences equations: 
 
it it t i i it u x y y 1 ,                 (2) 
 
for t = 3, ..., 16 and i = 1, ..., 14; where  1 ,t i y  is the lagged dependent variable and  it x are the 
other  regressors  including  endogenous  variables.  2 it y   and  all  previous  lags  are  used  as 
instruments for   yit-1, while  1 it x and all previous lags are instruments for  it x , assuming that 
[ ] 0 it is E u u   for  i=1,...N  and  t s ,  and  exploiting  two  sets  of  moment  conditions:  (i) 
, [ ] 0 i t s it E y u  for  T t ,..., 3 and  2 s ; and (ii) , [ ] 0 i t s it E x u  for  T t ,..., 2 and  1 s . Of 
course, differencing cancels out the individual-specific effect ( i = 0). 
The second part of the system contains T – 1 levels equations:  
 
it it it i it u x y y 1                  (3) 
 
for t = 2, ... , 16 and i = 1, ..., 14; where lagged first differences are used as instruments
9 for 
the additional equations,  based on the  assumption that  2 [ ] 0 ii Ey   for  i  = 1,...,14, and 
1 [ ] 0 ii Ex , provided  1i [ long run mean ] 0 ii Ey  holds. This yields (together with the 
standard assumptions for Equation (3)) additional moment conditions  ,1 [ , ] 0 i t i it E y u  
for i = 1,...,14 and t = 3, 4, ..., 16, and  , [ , ] 0 i t i it E x u  for i = 1,...,14 and t = 2, 4, ..., 16. 
                                                 
7 Given the small time period of our sample we could not determine the existence of unit roots with formal tests 
such as the Im, Pesharan, Shin test. However, inspection of the series suggests a high likeliness of unit roots.  
8 The consistency of the GMM system estimator in the presence of unit roots is verified in Binder et al. (2005). 
9 Note that there are no instruments for the first observation, yi2 , available.   12 
In our case this means: Given  the requirements E[X, Z] ≠ 0 for a suitable instruments set, we 
assume that past FDI stocks are correlated with present FDI flows (instruments for first part 
of the system) and that past FDI flows are suitable instruments for FDI stocks (instruments for 
second part of the system). Furthermore, given the requirement that the instruments must not 
be correlated with errors, i.e.,  , [ ] 0 i t s it E x u  and  , [ ] 0 it i t Ex , we assume that present 
productivity growth does not affect past FDI stocks nor does present productivity affect past 
FDI flows. Similarly, this type of instruments assumes that past institutional changes, past 
increase  in  education  or  export  rates  are  not  influenced  by  the  present  productivity  of  a 
country.  
GMM can be employed as a one-step or two-step estimator. The one-step estimator uses a 
given variance-covariance matrix while the two-step estimator uses the residuals of the first 
estimation step for the variance-covariance matrix  ˆ ˆˆ ' i i i uu Ω= , which is then used in the second 
step  of  the  estimation.  Both  estimators  provide  heteroscedasticity  consistent  variance-
covariance  matrices.  The  two-step  estimator  is  considered  to  be  more  efficient  with  a 
heteroscedastic  error  structure.  However,  when  the  number  of  cross  sections  is  small  in 
relation to the number of instruments the two-step standard errors become downward biased. 
In this case, the standard errors of the one-step estimator are more reliable (Blundell and Bond 
1998).
10 Since we have 14 cross sections and 16 time observations this issue wi ll be relevant 
in our estimation if more time lags are used as instruments.  Keeping this in mind, we report 
second-step estimates if the standard errors of the two-step estimate confirm the significance 
level of the first-step estimates, otherwise the first-step estimates are reported. 
In order to obtain consistent estimates the validity of instruments needs to be verified. It needs 
to be determined if the lagged variables are valid instruments and how many lags should be 
included as instruments.  
First, the requirement that instruments must not be correlated with residuals is tested. For that 
purpose,  the  Arellano  and  Bond  test  statistics  for  first  order  AR(1)  and  second  order 
autocorrelation AR(2) of residuals in differences  under the null of no serial cor relation are 
employed. Second, as Bowsher (2002) points out misspecification of the estimation model 
can arise when including  the wrong number of lags as instruments.  In order to assess the 
correct number of lags for the instrument set we use the  Hansen test statistic which tests the 
null hypothesis of joint validity of instruments (Hansen 1982).  
 
VI. Estimation results 
 
In the following we report the estimation results of the productivity effects of FDI for each 
sector according to the specification in Equation (1).  
In the full specification we have to face the fact that our variables are often correlated with 
each  other.  For  example,  it  turned  out  that  sector  FDI  is  often  highly  correlated  with 
institutional variables, education variables and sector exports —evidently because FDI in a 
sector will be higher if the institutional characteristics and education level in a country is 
better and because FDI and trade openness reinforce each other. Furthermore, sectoral FDI 
stocks are also correlated in most cases reflecting the general trend of increasing FDI intensity 
over the 1990s. In order to account for the resulting multicollinearity among regressors we 
will estimate each sector‘s specification step-wise. 
                                                 
10  Present  estimation  routines  use  the  Windemeijer  (2005)  procedure  which  approximates  the  variance-
covariance matrix around the true values with a Taylor series expansion. This procedure reduces the downward 
bias of the standard errors to some extent.   13 
The estimates start first with a basic specification where the impact of FDI and —if permitted 
by the correlation statistics— an institutional factor is tested. Second, we test the impact of an 
appropriate  education  variable  on  sector  productivity  leaving  aside  the  FDI  variable  if 
necessary. Third, we estimate the impact of sector exports on productivity independently of 
FDI. Fourth, we test the impact of FDI in other sectors, isolated from the intensity of FDI in 
the same sector.  
In several cases it turned out that FDI had no significant impact or had not the expected sign. 
In that case, we tested whether the impact of FDI depends on a specific threshold, like the 
income level or general and sector-specific institutional features.  
Generally,  the  variables  instrumented  are  sectoral  FDI  intensity,  institutions,  education, 
exports and FDI in other sectors. The exact set of instrumented variables is indicated in the 
tables reporting the results. In order to prevent the exponential increase of the number of 
instruments, we collapse them as in Carkovic and Levine (2005).  
For some sectors, FDI data is not available for all countries. Therefore, the number of cross 
sections  is  lower  in  some  cases.  Furthermore,  in  some  cases  results  are  sensitive  to  the 
exclusion of certain countries. Then results for country subsets are also reported. 
Given  the  many  potential  institutional  and  educational  variables  and  FDI  spillovers,  we 
estimated a large number of specifications. For the sake of clarity, only statistically significant 
results are reported.  
 
A. Primary sector 
 
With respect to agricultural production, our results (see Table 2) suggest that the presence of 
FDI  has  a  significant  positive  effect  on  the  sector‘s  productivity.  General  country  level 
institutional features such as better law and order as well as lesser price controls —those are 
often related to food prices— are positive for productivity. Evidently, a reduction in price 
controls leads to more competition and higher productivity.  A sound legal system, which 
guarantees  property  rights  results  in  a  more  productive  agricultural  sector.  Despite  the 
generally lower requirement of skilled workers in agriculture, the results suggest that LA 
countries  with  a  better  school  level  in  the  population  have  more  productive  agricultural 
sectors. This may mirror the fact that efficient agro-food systems are increasingly knowledge-
based. Moreover, LA countries with a high share of agricultural products in exports have a 
more productive agriculture, supporting the pro-competitive effect of trade hypothesis.  
Agricultural production enjoys productivity spillovers from FDI in manufacturing and the 
service  sectors:  transport  and  telecommunications.  Evidently,  if  foreign  capital  is  highly 
present in the manufacturing sector, particularly  in the agro-food industries where in fact 
many  foreign  companies  operate  in  LA,  there  will  be  a  high  request  on  efficiency  in 
agricultural productions. Furthermore, if foreign investment is present in transportation, the 
agricultural sector benefits from the enhanced productivity of those services.  
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Table 2: Estimation results Agriculture and Fishery  
 
dependent variable:  AGRI Y  
cross sections: 14               
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1 AGRI Y   0.876***  0.837***  0.854***  0.642***  0.751***  0.973***  0.941*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
AGRI FDI   0.248*  0.228*  0.152**  -0.0601       
  [0.056]  [0.074]  [0.035]  [0.45]       
LAW    0.457***    0.710***  0.554***     
    [0.0040]    [0.0077]  [0.0083]     
PRICECTRL      0.324*         
      [0.086]         
SCHOOL        3.898***  2.151**     
        [0.0021]  [0.013]     
AGRI X           1.708***     
          [0.0084]     
COMM TRANS FDI &             0.0326***   
            [0.0041]   
MANUF FDI               0.0687*** 
               [0.0030] 
GMM step  2-step  1-step  1-step  1-step  2-step  1-step  2-step 
Observations  210  210  210  210  224  205  210 
Instruments  9  13  14  14  14  8  8 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.044  0.035  0.040  0.028  0.023  0.035  0.032 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.191  0.226  0.153  0.196  0.137  0.156  0.178 
Hansen (p-value)  0.2  0.398  0.516  0.362  0.221  0.487  0.324 
 
Notes:  Robust  p-values  in  brackets  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1;  instruments  for 
MANUF COMM TRANS AGRI AGRI AGRI FDI FDI X SCHOOL PRICECTRL LAW FDI Y , , , , , , , & ;  AR  (1),  AR(2)  test 
statistics  for  autocorrelation  of  residuals  in  differences,  Hansen  test  statistics  for  joint  validity  of 
instruments 
 
As  we  discussed  in  section  II,  the  presence  of  FDI  is  very  high  in  the  LA  mining  and 
quarrying sector. Our results (see Table 3) suggest that this high intensity of FDI is also very 
important  for the productivity of the sector since  the estimates  show a high positive and 
significant coefficient.
11 
Corruption turned out to be an important variable affecting productivity in the mining and 
quarrying sector. Other factors like price controls, law, political risk , freedom and share of 
state ownership were not significant. Since mining and petroleum extraction is a branch for 
large scale, highly lucrative business, it can be expected that corruptive practices for rent -
seeking are favoured in the sector, with the effect of dampening productivi ty. Therefore, our 
results would indicate that extractive industries are more productive in less corrupt LA 
countries.  
Education,  measured  by  efficiency  of  educated  workforce,  is  also  an  important  factor 
affecting productivity in sector C. Since the varia ble is highly correlated with FDI in the 
sector, we estimated its impact in a separate equation excluding FDI. We also find that a high 
                                                 
11 The sector‘s productivity and FDI exhibits some noise after 2001, particularly in El Salvador. To account for 
it we exclude El Salvador from the sample.    15 
share  of  ores  and  fossil  fuels  in  a  country‘s  exports  has  a  significant  impact  on  the 
productivity of the sector. Thus, mining is more productive the more it is export-oriented. 
Important spillover effects are found from FDI in several upstream and downstream sectors. 
Manufacturing  FDI,  which  e.g.  is  extensively  found  in  the  petroleum  industry,  has  an 
important  impact  on the sectors productivity.  FDI of  another sector closely linked to  the 
extractive  industries,  construction,  is  also  significant  for  the  sector´s  productivity. 
Furthermore, foreign enterprises in other sectors providing services to extractive industries, 
namely  trading,  transport  and  telecommunications  as  well  as  financial  services  have 
productivity spillovers to mining.  
In summary, extractive industries appear to be more productive with heavy exporters with low 
corruption.  Besides  the  significant  direct  impact  of  FDI  on  the  sector´s  productivity,  this 
benefits particularly from FDI in input services and processing industries.  
 
Table 3: Estimation results Mining and Quarrying 
 
dependent variable:  MINING Y                
cross sections: 12
a 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1 MINING Y   0.540***  0.592***  0.819***  0.378**  0.628***  0.716***  0.503***  0.464** 
  [0.002]  [0.008]  [0.001]  [0.039]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.043] 
MINING FDI   0.313**               
  [0.021]               
CORR  1.554**  1.071*  1.469  1.779**  1.865***  1.637**  1.715***  1.626** 
  [0.032]  [0.088]  [0.185]  [0.014]  [0.006]  [0.015]  [0.001]  [0.042] 
SCHOOL    4.056*             
    [0.068]             
MINING X       3.636***           
      [0.010]           
MANUF FDI  
   
    0.570** 
[0.020] 
       
 
CONSTR FDI           0.246**       
          [0.029]       
COMM TRANS FDI &             0.109**     
            [0.022]     
TRADE FDI               0.515**   
              [0.011]   
FINANCE FDI                 0.446** 
                 [0.029] 
GMM step  2-step  2-step  1-step    2-step  2-step  2-step  2-step 
Observations  185  192  185    185  180  185  185 
Instruments  9  8  8    10  10  10  10 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.029  0.031  0.088    0.023  0.023  0.030  0.034 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.748  0.564  0.395    0.708  0.427  0.767  0.648 
Hansen (p-value)  0.177  0.720  0.156    0.180  0.150  0.224  0.119 
Notes: 
a  El Salvador (poor data) and Costa Rica (missing data) excluded. 
 Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; instruments for 
FINANCE TRADE COMM TRANS CONST MANUF MINING MINING MINING FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI X SCHOOL CORR FDI Y , , , , , , , , , & ;  
AR (1), AR(2) test statistics for autocorrelation of residuals in differences, Hansen test statistics for joint 
validity of instruments. 
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B. Manufacturing  
 
The estimation results (see Table 4) indicate that FDI has a positive and significant impact on 
manufacturing productivity; however, the effect is lower than in most other sectors. This may 
indicate that foreign owned plants in the manufacturing sector have no pro-competitive effects 
on the local industry.  
Law  and  political  risk  and  the  degree  of  protection  by  import  tariffs  are  important 
determinants of the productivity of this sector (see columns (1) – (3) in Table 4), in contrast to 
other likely institutional variables such as the freedom index, corruption and price controls 
(results not reported). These results indicate that a better developed system of law and order,  
 
Table 4: Estimation results Manufacturing 
dependent variable:  MANUF Y              




a  (4)  (5)  (6)
a  (7)  (8) 
1 MANUF Y   0.923***  0.928***  0.992***  0.914***  0.975***  0.961***  0.974***  0.946*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
MANUF FDI   0.0480***  0.0479**             
  [0.0064]  [0.016]             
POLRI  0.550**               
  [0.021]               
LAW    0.226***  0.132*  0.134**  0.169*  0.131**  0.146***  0.153** 
    [0.0021]  [0.058]  [0.046]  [0.066]  [0.036]  [0.0054]  [0.016] 
TARIFF      -1.009*           
      [0.054]           
SCHOOL        0.816*         
        [0.056]         
MANUF X           -2.082*       
          [0.054]       
GDPPC X MANUF           0.237**       
          [0.044]       
MINING FDI             0.0172*     
            [0.096]     
COMM TRANS FDI &               0.0077*   
              [0.092]   
FINANCE FDI                 0.0378* 
                 [0.069] 
GMM step  2-step  2-step  1-step  1-step  2-step  1-step  2-step  1-step 
Observations  210  210  199  224  224  194  205  203 
Instruments  14  14  13  16  14  12  11  14 
AR(1)p-value)  0.005  0.006  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.008  0.007 
AR(2)p-value)  0.259  0.273  0.342  0.362  0.364  0.3  0.228  0.276 
Hansen (p-value)  0.267  0.337  0.247  0.596  0.33  0.348  0.556  0.496 
 
Notes: 
a  13  cross  sections;  robust  p-values  in  brackets  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1;  instruments  for 
FINANCE COMM TRANS MINING MANUF MAUNUF MANUF FDI FDI FDI GDPPC X X SCHOOL TARIFF LAW POLRI FDI , , , , , , , , , & ; 
AR  (1),  AR(2)  test  statistics  for  autocorrelation  of  residuals  in  differences,  Hansen  test  statistics  for  joint 
validity of instruments. 
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less  import  tariffs  and  less  political  risk  have  a  positive  impact  on  productivity  in  the 
manufacturing  sector.  Those  institutional  features  would  guarantee  more  certainty  in  the 
manufacturing‘s  business  and  promote  competition  through  more  imports  which  would 
benefit productivity.  
Productivity of the manufacturing sector depends to a major extent (note the high coefficient) 
on the level of education in the country, measured by efficiency of workforce. 
A high export share has only a positive impact on the manufacturing sector‘s productivity in 
richer economies (with a GDP per capita of above 6500 US-$, i.e., in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Mexico). Such a threshold effect of development was also found for example, 
in Chang et al. (2009). Together with the positive impact of low tariffs reported above, this 
indicates that LA manufacturing productivity is importantly determined by trade openness.  
FDI  in  financial  services  as  well  as  in  transport  and  telecommunications  have  positive 
productivity spillover effects on manufacturing. As we shall see below, the efficiency of these 
two service sectors benefits from FDI. Since those services  are particularly important for 
manufacturing, we find that manufacturing benefits from FDI in these business services as 
well. We also find a positive productivity spillover from FDI in mining and quarrying. This 
might indicate that the high dominance of foreign companies in mining and quarrying will 
request the downstream industries processing raw materials to become more efficient. 
In summary we see that LA manufacturing productivity depends primarily on the education 
level, followed by trade openness and low political risk. In relation to these factors, the FDI 
impact is of minor importance for the sector.  
 
C. Service sector 
 
Estimating the impact of FDI on productivity in the electricity, gas and water supply sector 
(see Table 5), we find a statistically significant negative coefficient. However, it appears that 
the effect of FDI was only negative in the pre-2001 period. For the post-2001 period the effect 
of FDI is significantly positive and shows the highest coefficient compared to other sectors. 
We also checked the sensitivity of the FDI coefficient for different country groups and in 
interaction with the degree of privatization in the sector, measured by the share of private 
investment in the sector. This did not provide additional insight. 
There are a number of specific institutional factors present in this sector, the influence of 
which we estimated either together with FDI or alone depending on correlations between the 
two variables. Bureaucracy, corruption, price controls, and the share of private investment in 
the  sector  all  show  positive  coefficients,  indicating  that  an  improvement  in  these  factors 
enhances productivity in the sector (Note we did not instrument institutional variables in this 
estimation considering the indications of the difference Sargan test). A higher educational 
level, measured by efficiency of workforce, is also beneficial for productivity as indicated by 
the  positive  coefficient.  Since  the  public  services  in  this  sector  have  been  traditionally 
monopolies which can strengthen their position by corrupt practices, our results indicate that 
in  less  corrupt  economies  competition  in  the  sector  develops  faster  and  promotes  its 
productivity. Similarly, the positive coefficients of privatization and price controls indicate 
that productivity would benefit via the positive effect of deeper privatization and less price 
controls on competition in the sector.  
We  also  find  some  interesting  spillover  effects  from  FDI  in  other  sectors.  FDI  in 
manufacturing  has  a  positive  effect  on  productivity  in  electricity,  gas  and  water.  An 
interpretation  can  be  that  more  foreign  capital  in  manufacturing  would  demand  more 
competitive prices in public services and thus benefit the sector‘s productivity. A positive   18 
spillover effect from FDI in the transport and telecommunications sector is found only in the 
post-2001 period. Given that privatization programmes were introduced in the transport and 
communications sector in the same period, that sector may have served as a role model for 
electricity, gas and water.  
To conclude, privatization as such and human resources are the most decisive factors for 
productivity in the electricity, gas and water sector. Market liberalization through less price 
control follows in importance. FDI became an important productivity enhancing factor in the 
late privatization period. 
  
 
Table 5: Estimation results Electricity, Gas and Water 
 
dependent variable:  W G ELEC Y & &                  





 a  (5)
b  (6)  (7)
a  (8)  (9) 
Variable  pre-2001  post-2001                    post-2001 
W G ELEC Y & &   1.018***  0.561**  0.776***  0.921***  0.877***  0.959***  0.586**  0.887***  0.626*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.042]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.015]  [0.0000]  [0.0036] 
W G ELEC FDI & &   -0.0188*  0.414*  -0.0323  -0.000478  -0.0779*    -0.0576*     
  [0.077]  [0.073]  [0.46]  [0.97]  [0.081]    [0.086]     
BURO      2.300*             
      [0.058]             
CORR        0.625*           
        [0.052]           
PRICECTRL          0.984*         
          [0.058]         
W G ELEC INV PRIV & & _             7.020**       
            [0.041]       
SCHOOL              6.330**     
              [0.046]     
MANUF FDI                 0.153*   
                [0.058]   
COMM TRANS FDI &                   0.466** 
                           [0.046] 
GMM-step  2-step  2-step  1-step  1-step  1-step  1-step  1-step  1-step  1-step 
Observations  98  63  174  174  140  224  174  210  68 
Instruments  10  9  11  9  11  7  14  9  9 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.064  0.146  0.025  0.023  0.024  0.007  0.036  0.005  0.014 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.257  0.794  0.578  0.559  0.689  0.314  0.687  0.908  0.504 
Hansen (p-value)  0.399  0.438  0.244  0.134  0.559  0.266  0.444  0.325  0.173 
 
Notes: 
a  Costa  Rica excluded due to  missing  FDI data.
  b Venezuela and  Argentina excluded due to  missing data for 
PRICECTRL;  robust  p-values  in  brackets  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1;  variables  instrumented: 
COMM TRANS MANUF W G ELEC W G ELEC FDI FDI FDI Y & & & & & , , , . No instruments for CORR, BURO, PRICECTRL, SCHOOL; AR 
(1), AR(2) test statistics for autocorrelation of residuals in differences, Hansen test statistics for joint validity of 
instruments. 
 
Our results concerning the negative relationship between FDI and the sectors productivity in 
pre-2001 is supported, e.g., by the report of ECLAC (2005) which indicates that the inflow of 
FDI in the electricity sector did not prevent the sector from slipping into a crisis in the 1990s 
and attributes it to the misfunctioning of the new regulatory system and climatic conditions.   19 
The institutional factors which we found to be important for the sector‘s productivity are 
similar to the findings of other studies. For example, Chong and Lópes de Silanes (2005) 
point out that an important condition for productivity increasing privatizations in LA was 
little inference of the state and a low level of corruption together with clear new regulations 
for the sector.  
Since  the  privatization  process  and  inflow  of  foreign  capital  in  the  transport  and 
telecommunications sector and the consequent market orientation took place in a very similar 
fashion as in electricity, gas and water, we present the estimation results for this sector (see 
Table 6) immediately in this place. 
In the transport and telecommunication sector as well, a positive effect from FDI on sector 
productivity is subject to a certain condition, namely it depends on the income level of the 
country. The coefficient of the interaction term indicates an income threshold where only 
Argentina, Mexico and Chile can draw productivity gains from FDI in the sector.  
 
Table 6: Estimation results Transport and Telecommunications 
 
dependent variable:  COMM TRANS Y &      
cross sections: 14       
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1 &COMM TRANS Y   1.006***  1.005***  1.006*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
COMM TRANS FDI &   -0.0085*  -0.0889*  -0.0769* 
  [0.057]  [0.061]  [0.069] 
GDPPC FDI COMM TRANS&     0.0097*  0.0079* 
    [0.071]  [0.097] 
COMM TRANS INV PRIV & _       1.360* 
       [0.061] 
GMM step  1-step  1-step  1-step 
Observations  205  205  205 
Instruments  9  13  15 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.019  0.019  0.019 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.026  0.023  0.025 
Hansen (p-value)  0.625  0.596  0.529 
 
Notes:  Robust  p-values  in  brackets,  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1;  variables 
instrumented  GDPPC FDI FDI Y COMM TRANS COMM TRANS COMM TRANS & & 1 & , , .  No 
instruments  for  COMM TRANS INV PRIV & _ ;  AR  (1),  AR(2)  test  statistics  for 




As  the  telecommunications  and  transport  sector  depends  on  very  business  specific 
environments,  we are not  surprised to  find no  impact  of  general  institutional  features.  In 
contrast, we find that the extent of achieved privatization in the sector can explain very well 
its  productivity  level.  The  positive  coefficient  indicates  that  a  higher  share  of  private 
investment in the sector leads to an increase in productivity in the sector. We also find that the 
actual extent of privatization is decisive for the productivity gain rather than the switch from 
state monopoly to a system with free market access (a dummy for the privatization period was 
tried in the estimation as well without providing any insight, results are not reported). We 
have to bear in mind that the development of privatization is not identical with that of FDI. 
Foreign companies started to invest in the sector when the first privatizations had already   20 
been accomplished for some time. The special type of capital presented by FDI did not benefit 
productivity growth of all countries as explained above. Moreover, if we regard the size of the 
coefficients  of  the  two  variables  we  have  to  note  that  the  productivity  gain  from  FDI  is 
negligible in contrast to the effect of privatization. 
The effect of education (efficiency of workforce) did not appear as a significant coefficient 
for  productivity  growth  in  the  sector.  Furthermore,  our  estimations  could  not  verify  any 
spillover effects to the sector‘s productivity from FDI in other sectors.  
Our results  are similar  to  the finding of Fink  et  al.  (2003)  who  finds  that the degree of 
competition introduced by privatization and the efficiency of the regulator is important, two 
factors which are represented by our privatization measure.  
 
With respect to the construction sector, one has to note that foreign owned construction firms 
typically operate in the area of large scale, prestigious infrastructure projects and buildings in 
LA countries. Our estimations (see Table 7) indicate that FDI as such has no positive impact 
on the productivity of the sector. However, we find a positive significant coefficient of FDI 
under certain conditions: if law and order is well developed and corruption is low. However, 
low  corruption,  developed  law  and  order  and  low  political  risk  are  decisive  institutional 
factors themselves enhancing productivity of the sector, as indicated by the much higher  
 
Table 7: Estimation results Construction 
 
Dependent variable:  CONSTR Y            
cross sections: 13
a             
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1 CONSTR Y   0.906***  0.956***  0.924***  0.976***  0.989***  0.900*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
CONSTR FDI   0.0536  -0.0017  0.0127  -0.000384  -0.0189  0.00223 
  [0.13]  [0.94]  [0.69]  [0.99]  [0.43]  [0.92] 
CORR  0.377**           
  [0.010]           
LAW    0.282**         
    [0.040]         
POLRI      0.928*       
      [0.078]       
CORR FDICONSTR         0.0324*     
        [0.086]     
LAW FDICONSTR           0.0295*   
          [0.085]   
SCHOOL            1.159 
            [0.23] 
GMM step  1-step  2-step  2-step  1-step  1-step  1-step 
Observations  184  184  184  184  184  184 
Instruments  14  13  13  13  12  13 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.013  0.028  0.022  0.016  0.023  0.017 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.336  0.49  0.488  0.384  0.471  0.491 
Hansen (p-value)  0.601  0.387  0.348  0.606  0.292  0.292 
Notes: 
a  13  cross  sections  due  to  missing  FDI  data  Costa  Rica.  Robust  p-values  in  brackets.  
***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1;  variables  instrumented 
LAW FDI CORR FDI POLRI LAW CORR FDI Y CONSTR CONSTR CONSTR CONSTR , , , , , , ; AR (1), AR(2) test statistics 
for autocorrelation of residuals in differences, Hansen test statistics for joint validity of instruments.    21 
 
 
coefficient.  These  results  are  very  plausible.  The  construction  sector  is  very  sensitive  to 
unclear legal situations that may determine a project. Corruption is a common practice in the 
construction business that eliminates competition. If a country is not haunted by these factors 
productivity in the construction sector is better and FDI can generate productivity enhancing 
effects. We could not find a statistically significant coefficient for education, obviously since 
construction is not skill demanding. 
In  the  trading,  hotels  and  restaurants  sector  our  estimates  indicate  as  well  a  positive 
productivity effect from FDI (see Table 8). Even more, however, the sector‘s productivity 
depends on political risk, law and order and bureaucracy. Obviously these business activities 
operate better in a sound legal framework and with a better functioning bureaucracy. Tourism 
activities included in this sector are certainly influenced by political risk. The sector is not 
skill intensive which is confirmed by the insignificant coefficient of education. FDI spillover 
effects  from  the  manufacturing  and  transport  and  telecommunication  sector  prove  to  be 
significantly positive. Since trading is an input service for the manufacturing sector, foreign  
 
Table 8: Estimation results Trading, Hotels and Restaurants 
 
dependent variable:  TRADE Y            
cross sections: 14             
variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (6)  (5) 
1 TRADE Y   0.955***  0.963***  0.926***  0.982***  0.983***  0.994*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
TRADE FDI   0.0215*  0.0260***  0.0256**  0.0308**     
  [0.077]  [0.00078]  [0.040]  [0.048]     
LAW  0.181***           
  [0.0000]           
BURO    0.159**         
    [0.029]         
POLRI      0.700***       
      [0.0087]       
SEC        -0.336     
        [0.67]     
MANUF FDI           0.0169*   
          [0.098]   
COMM TRANS FDI &             0.00859** 
             [0.036] 
GMM step  2-step  2-step  2-step  2-step  2-step  2-step 
Observations  210  210  210  210  210  205 
Instruments  13  12  13  12  11  10 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.331  0.136  0.113  0.235  0.262  0.285 
Hansen (p-value)  0.53  0.621  0.428  0.487  0.398  0.538 
 
Notes: Robust p values in brackets . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; variables instrumented 
COMM TRANS MANUF TRADE TRADE FDI FDI SEC POLRI BURO LAW FDI Y & 1 , , , , , , , ; AR (1), AR(2) 
test statistics for autocorrelation of residuals in differences, Hansen test statistics for 
joint validity of instruments 
   22 
investors in manufacturing will also press for improved performance in trading. For the sector 
trading and tourism in turn, transport and communication is an important complementary 
service.  Therefore,  trading,  hotels  and  restaurants  will  also  benefit  from  productivity 
improvement from FDI in sector transport and telecommunications.  
Finally, we find that FDI in the financial and business services has a positive and significant 
impact on the sector‘s productivity (see Table 9), although there is some evidence that this 
effect would become negative for high income countries (see the interaction effect in Column 
(2), none of our countries is above the indicated income threshold for a negative effect). There 
is evidence that the efficiency of the sector suffers from stressed financial markets, which we 
captured by the extent of credit lending to the banking sector and the degree of external debts. 
The  coefficients  indicate  that  in  a  situation  of  higher  debts  and  more  credit  lending  the 
productivity of this sector slows down. No significant impact of education on the sector‘s 
productivity can be found and no productivity spillover effects from FDI in other sectors act 
on productivity in the financial services.  
 
Table 9: Estimation results Financial and Business Services 
 
dependent variable:  FINANCE Y      
cross sections: 14     
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1 FINANCE Y   0.962***  0.974***  0.990*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
FINANCE FDI   0.0652**  0.321*  0.0433* 
  [0.048]  [0.062]  [0.098] 
EXTDEBT  -0.0845***  -0.109**   
  [0.0040]  [0.023]   
CREDITBANK      -0.344*** 
      [0.0009] 
GDPPC FDI FINANCE     -0.0315*   
     [0.074]   
GMM step  2-step  2-step  2-step 
Observations  193  203  203 
Instruments  13  12  10 
AR(1) (p-value)  0.015  0.0132  0.012 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.17  0.151  0.179 
Hansen (p-value)  0.208  0.167  0.151 
 
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
variables  instrumented: 
GDPPC FDI FDI Y FINANCE FINANCE FINANCE , , 1 ;  AR  (1),  AR(2)  test 
statistics for autocorrelation of residuals in differences, Hansen 
test statistics for joint validity of instruments 
 
In summary, our estimates indicate positive and significant productivity effects from FDI in 
the majority of sectors but not in all of them. The primary sectors (agriculture, mining and 
quarrying)  as  well  as  financial  and  business  services  benefit  the  most  from  FDI.  In 
manufacturing as well as in trade and tourism the productivity effect arising from the presence 
of foreign firms in the sector is much lower. 
This difference seems to be related to the firm structure. The few large scale companies 
dominating  LA  agriculture  and  extractive  industries  all   benefit  from  new  technologies 
provided by FDI. Similarly, the few, weak domestic banks in LA all seem to benefit from new 
practices introduced by foreign capital. In contrast, the much lower size of the coefficient of   23 
FDI in manufacturing as well as in tourism might be explained by the two components which 
make up this effect. Although a direct productivity enhancing effect may work in the firm of 
investment,  there  might  be  no  productivity  enhancing  effects  on  local  producers  in 
manufacturing.  One  may  consider,  for  example,  electronic  components  manufacturing  in 
Mexico which hardly has established any links with (other branches of) local industries.  
In three service sectors a positive productivity effect of FDI is less clear. The entry of foreign 
capital in the electricity, gas and water supply sector affected productivity only positively 
after 2001 but not in the early privatization period. In the transport and telecommunications 
sector efficiency gains from FDI where only registered in the rich LA countries. FDI in the 
construction  sector  is  only  productivity  enhancing  in  a  sound  legal  environment  of  low 
corruption. Except for the late privatization period in the electricity, gas and water sector, the 
impact of FDI is fairly low in these sectors.  
 
Table 10: Summary: Direct productivity effects from FDI in the sector and spillovers effects  
from FDI in other sectors. 
 
Sector   productivity effect 
from FDI in the 
sector
a 
conditional factor  productivity spillover effects from 
FDI in other sectors 
Agriculture  + (0.15, 0.25)   
MANUF FDI      +0.07 




+ 0.31   
MANUF FDI      +0.57 
CONSTR FDI    + 0.24 
COMM TRANS FDI &   +0.10 
FINANCE FDI    +0.45 
 
Manufacturing  + 0.048   
MINING FDI      +0.02 
COMM TRANS FDI &   +0.008 
FINANCE FDI   +0.04 
 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water 
- (-0.05, -0.009) 
+ 0.41 (post 2001) 
 
MANUF FDI    +0.15 
COMM TRANS FDI &   +0.47  




- (-0.08, -0.009)  GDPPC 
+ (0.008, 0.010) 
    insignificant 
 
 
Construction     insignificant  CORR + 0.03 
LAW   + 0.03 
    insignificant 
 
 
Trading, Hotels and 
Restaurants 
+ (0.02, 0.03)   
MANUF FDI    + 0.02 




+ (0.04, 0.32)  GDPPC - 0.03      insignificant 
 
Notes: 
a sign and coefficient range 
 
 
We could identify manifold productivity spillover effects from FDI. First of all, FDI in the 
manufacturing  sector  is  a  source  of   productivity  spillovers  to  several  upstream  and 
downstream sectors. Also, from FDI in transport and telecommunications several spillover   24 
effects arise. The presence of FDI in financial and business services seems to benefit only the 
manufacturing sector and mining.  
Finally, one has to note that FDI is not the most important factor for productivity in LA 
countries. Institutional factors, export orientation of the sector and education play a more 




In this paper we wished to investigate the productivity effects of inward FDI in LA countries 
at the sectoral level. Given that the literature remains inconclusive concerning the effects of 
FDI in LA, we consider that an analysis  at the sectoral level can help to understand the 
relationship. However, our analysis does not only consider the effects of FDI in different 
sectors but  considers in  addition  the productivity  effects  that this  FDI  can have on other 
sectors.  
Consequently, our investigation considers the complex way in which FDI acts in an economy: 
(i) it analyses the productivity effects of FDI within a sector and (ii) assesses the productivity 
spillovers of FDI to other sectors.  
In doing so, we gain insight in which sectors FDI has been most beneficial in LA countries, 
and furthermore, from which sectors FDI will show the largest productivity spreads on the 
economy. 
We estimated the sectoral productivity effect of FDI and spillovers in a model accounting for 
institutional factors specifically important for the sectors, for education levels and the export 
level of the sector.  
From an econometric point of view, the estimation of such a model is challenging since it 
requires taking endogeneity and multicollinearity of variables duly into account. These issues 
are often neglected in panel data models investigating FDI effects. We decided to employ the 
GMM system estimator and argue that it can perfectly meet our econometric requirements.  
Indeed, our estimations permit to explain why the productivity effect of FDI at the aggregate 
level of the economy is statistically not significant. At the sector level, we find that FDI has a 
positive and significant impact in many sectors, but not in all of them. Particularly in the 
electricity,  gas  and  water  supply  sector,  the  transport  and  communications  sector  and  in 
construction, FDI does either not yield the expected results or only under specific conditions. 
In  the  first  two  of  them  which  have  undergone  profound  reforms  and  privatization 
programmes in the 1990s, productivity benefited from FDI only with some delay (electricity 
gas, water) or only in the rich LA countries (transport and telecommunication). An important 
finding is that FDI has the highest productivity effect in LA in the primary sector, i.e., in 
agriculture and mining and quarrying, and in financial services. The impact of FDI in other 
sectors,  above  all  in  manufacturing,  is  much  lower  and  ―as  mentioned  before―  has 
sometimes not the expected effect. However, looking at the productivity spillover effects of 
FDI, it turns out that FDI in manufacturing has the largest effect on other sectors of the 
economy. Evidently this is because manufacturing needs manifold intermediate products and 
services as inputs and foreign-owned, more efficient producers will demand higher standards 
from  their  local  suppliers.  Noteworthy  productivity  spillovers  arise  also  from  FDI  in  the 
transport and telecommunications sector. Finally, an important finding is that FDI has a much 
weaker impact on LA sectoral productivity than other policy variables.    25 
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Appendix 
 
Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Dependent variable  
Yj  Definition:  
logarithm of gross value added (GVA) in sector j in constant US-$ 
(2000 prices) per employed person in sector j 
 
Calculation and data source:  
GVA sector j at 2000 US-$: calculated from total GVA 2000 US-$ 
and sectoral structure of GVA at current prices  / j j j GVA GVA . 
Data: ECLAC.  
Employed persons in sector j obtained from sectoral employment 
shares (ECLAC) and total employment (WDI). Employed persons 
include salary and self employed. 
 
Foreign direct investment 
FDIj  Definition:  
logarithm of FDI inward stock in US-$ in sector j per employed in 
sector j  
 
Calculation and data source:  
FDI inward stocks from Unctad, completed with data from LA Central 
Banks and investment promotion agencies.  
Missing data completed by (i) interpolation, (ii) backward and 
forward completion by subtraction/addition of FDI flows.  
Employed persons see above.  
 
FDI interaction terms 
CORR FDICONSTR   interaction FDI stock per employed in sector F and corruption index 
(see below) 
 
LAW FDICONSTR   interaction FDI stock per employed in sector F and law and order 
index (see below) 
 
GDPPC FDI COMM TRANS&   interaction FDI stock per employed in sector I and GDP per capita of 
country 
 
GDPPC FDI FINANCE   interaction FDI stock per employed in sector JK and GDP per capita 
of country 
 
Country level institution variables 
POLRI  Definition:  
index of political risk, takes values from 0 - 1,  
higher index indicates less political risk.  
 
Data source:  
calculated from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), PRS group 
 
LAW  Definition:  
index of law and order enforcement, in logarithms, takes values 0 – 
1.8 
higher index value indicates better law and order enforcement. 
 
Data source:  
calculated from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), PRS group 
 
CORR  Definition:  
index of corruption, in logarithms, takes values 0 – 1.8 
higher index value indicates less corruption 
 
Data source:  
calculated from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), PRS group 
 
BURO  Definition:    29 
index of bureaucratic quality, in logarithms, takes values 0 – 1.8 
 
Data source:  
calculated from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), PRS group 
 
PRICECTRL  Definition:  
index of price control, in logarithms, takes values 0 – 2.3 
higher index indicates less price controls 
 
Data source:  
calculated from Fraser Institute 
 
FREEDOM  Definition:  
aggregated (chain-linked) freedom index, in logarithms, takes values 
0-2.3 
higher index indicates more freedom 
 
Data source:  
Fraser Institute 
 
Sector-specific institution variables 
TARIFF  Definition:  
Average tariff on manufactured imports (22 product lines), share of 
import value.  
Data source:  
Unctad TRAINS database.  
 
COMM TRANS INV PRIV & _   Definition:  
share of private telecommunications investment in GVA of sector I, 
accumulated since first year of private investment 
 
Data source:  
calculated from private investment projects in operation  
reported by World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Project 
(http://ppi.worldbank.org/)  
GVA from ECLAC 
 
W G ELEC INV PRIV & & _   Definition:  
share of private investment in electricity, gas, water and sewerage 
investment in GVA of sector E, accumulated since first year of private 
investment 
 
Data source:  
calculated from private investment projects in operation  
reported by World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Project 
(http://ppi.worldbank.org/)  
GVA from ECLAC 
 
Sector-specific institution variables - financial depth 
EXTDEBT  Definition:  
external debt as a share of GDP  
 
Data Source:  
calculated from WDI 
 
CREDITBANK  Definition:  
Domestic credit provided by banking sector as share of GDP.  
 
Data source:  
calculated from WDI 
 
Education   
PRIM  Definition:  
share of adult population with completed primary education  
 
Calculation and data source:  
annual series calculated from Barro and Lee (2000) 5 year data by 
interpolation, 2001-06 extrapolation using growth of primary 
education completion rate in the relevant age group (WDI) 
    30 
 
SEC  Definition:  
share of adult population with completed secondary education  
 
Calculation and data source:  
annual series calculated from Barro and Lee (2000) 5 year data by 
interpolation, 2001-06 extrapolated using one year-lagged growth rate 
of the number of pupils in secondary education (WDI) 
 
TERT  Definition:  
share of adult population with completed tertiary education  
 
Calculation and data source:  
annual series calculated from Barro and Lee (2000) 5 year data by 
interpolation, 2001-06 extrapolation using one year lagged growth of 
tertiary gross enrolment rate (WDI) 
 
SCHOOL  Definition:  
Measure of the relative efficiency of an educated worker with respect 
to illiterate person, following Hall and Jones (1999)  
 
Calculation and data source:  
SCHOOL = ln (HC/EMP) where EMP are employed persons and  
) exp( years return EMP HC where 
the return is assumed 0.134 for less than 4 years of school, 0.101 for 
years of school 4-8 and 0.068 for years above 8; years is average 
years of school completed in country.  
 
Average years of schooling of the total population from Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Universidad Nacional de la Plata and World Bank LAC poverty group 
(http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/sedlac/default.html). 
Employment ECLAC  
 
Trade variables   
AGRI X   Definition:  
agricultural exports as share of total merchandise exports 
 
Data source: WDI 
 
MINING X   Definition:  
exports of ores and fuels as share of total merchandise exports  
 
Data source: WDI 
 
MANUF X   Definition:  
Exports of manufactures as share of GVA of manufacturing sector 
 
Data Source:  
exports of manufactures (WDI), GVA manufacturing (ECLAC)  
 
GDPPC X MANUF   interaction term of export share in sector D and GDP per capita of 
country 
 
 